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 Since the Cold War, socialism has become a taboo subject in the American 
mindset because of its close association to communism.  In government and academics, 
socialism has had a polarizing effect causing politicians and intellectuals often to make or 
lose their careers in connection with their views of it.  One of the most controversial 
subjects in this ongoing debate is wealth redistribution.  The question of the 
implementation of this seemingly socialist ideal has sparked repeated political quarrels in 
American history. 
Opponents of wealth redistribution commonly argue that it assaults one of the 
fundamentals of our society—the belief that people should rise and fall according to their 
inherent ability or merit.  As such, it is commonly considered an un-American practice.  
Conversely, I would argue that wealth redistribution has been crucial to America’s 
formulation of meritocratic principles as our history is littered with examples of taking 
wealth that was often unearned and redistributing it as opportunity—an integral 
component to a merit-based society. 
First, it needs to be clearly established what is meant by the concept of merit.  
Throughout this paper, phrases such as inherent potential (innate ability, merit, etcetera) 
will be used interchangeably.  Each refers to the innate ability of an individual for the 
achievement of success.  The actual achievement level attained is dependent upon that 
innate ability coupled with environmental factors.  As work habits and self-motivational 
skills are acquired, they are considered a synthesis of innate ability and environment 
rather than a separate variable.  These factors are referred to in this paper in many ways 
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including as opportunity, resources, tools, etcetera.  Meritocracy is defined, for the 
purposes of this paper, as a form of society where environmental factors are equal for all 
persons and therefore individual achievement is the sole result of innate ability. 
Our country, since even before its founding, represented this ideal of meritocracy.  
It was a place where people like Benjamin Franklin, a man born to a candle maker, could 
rise from apparent obscurity to stand as a major figure on the world stage.1  Franklin’s 
rise can be attributed to several reasons but perhaps the most salient is the application of 
merit, the exercise of individual achievement.  From the vestiges of a centuries-old feudal 
system that determined a person’s status based on birth, emerged a “city upon a hill” that 
represented an escape from the stultifying effects of this reality.2  Our nation was a 
symbol of the idea that human beings had an inherent potential that transcended the social 
conditions of their birth.  It was a system that held that if given opportunity, persons from 
every walk of life could accomplish great achievements. 
 The American meritocratic principle is derived from micro- and macroeconomic 
factors. This is not to say that theorists, intellectuals, and theologians have not 
participated in the formation of American values.  The success of ideals, however, is 
dependent upon their connection with reality.  In matters concerning finances, radical 
theories will not remain radical if their application results in financial success time after 
time.  They will become doctrine.  If through studying the financial success of the United 
States, meritocratic practices appear crucial to its emergence as the strongest economy in 
the world, we might reasonably assume that this is directly related to our acceptance of 
                                               
1
 The Autobiography of Benjamin Franklin (New York: 1909), Project Gutenberg, July 1994, 
http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/plucker/148/148. 
2
 John Winthrop, “A Model of Christian Charity,” The Religious Freedom Page, 
http://religiousfreedom.lib.virginia.edu/sacred/charity.html. 
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merit-based principles.  In consideration of that, this work is devoted not to a study of the 
evolution of literature around the formation of meritocratic principle but instead to the 
economic and socioeconomic factors that contributed to the formation of the American 
meritocratic precedent. 
Wealth and income are the other crucial components that will be focused on in 
this paper.  Often both components are used to measure success as well as the incentives 
for obtaining it. The wealth of an individual can comprise many things.  It is often seen as 
some tangible piece of property but that is certainly not its only form.  The economist 
John Stuart Mill believed that “to an individual anything is wealth, which, though useless 
in itself, enables him to claim from others part of their stock of things useful and 
pleasant.”3  Mill uses the example of a mortgage “which is wealth to the individual to 
whom it brings revenue.”4  In this way, wealth is described as an asset that produces 
something of value, usually income.  On a national basis, wealth was identified by Adam 
Smith as “the annual produce of the land and labour of the society.”5  To each country, 
wealth is the exercise of its ability to produce over a given year.  Individuals, driven by 
the desire to accumulate personal wealth, increase the production and therefore wealth of 
the country.  Wealth redistribution is therefore seen as removing a crucial incentive for 
success, taking from those who earned it in favor of giving to those who did not.  Without 
incentive, less work is performed, less production occurs, and the country as a whole is 
made less wealthy.  Or so the argument goes. 
                                               
3
 John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy, With Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy 
(London: 1909), The Library of Economics and Liberty, http://www.econlib.org/library/Mill/mlP.html. 
4
 Mill, Principles of Political Economy. 
5
 Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (London: Printed for W. 
Strahan and T. Cadell, 1776) English Short Title Catalogue, Eighteenth Century Collections Online, Gale 
Group, http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/ECCO, 1: 4. 
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This argument that wealth redistribution weakens, if not destroys, a merit-based 
system cannot, however, be accepted without critical examination.  In order to be a result 
of merit, wealth must be something gained through individual achievement.  This is not 
always the case.  One of the major vessels in which wealth is transferred is inheritance.  
This requires no more work or talent than successfully navigating a birth canal.  In our 
modern era, studies have shown that roughly 20 percent of privately held wealth comes 
directly from bequests and gifts.6  This is not the full extent of what amounts to 
inheritance, however.  How much future wealth was gained by the individual from the 
inheritance received must be considered.  If all wealth transferred to offspring after 
reaching adulthood was to be calculated and accumulated interest were factored in, the 
figure has been shown to come to around 80 percent.7   This figure, too, is imperfect.  
First, it assumes that those receiving inheritance will invest it and receive the going rate 
of return.  It may be that they lack the investment savvy that “self-made” people possess, 
or it may be that they have additional investment opportunities because of the heightened 
status into which they were born.  Nevertheless, the two figures of 20 to 80 percent give 
us at least a range of the possible amount of private wealth held as a result of inheritance.  
Other studies, calculating the amount of private wealth made up of inheritance or derived 
from it, have come up with amounts anywhere between those two figures.8 
This huge amount of inheritance becomes troubling to the concept of meritocracy 
when examining how polarized wealth distribution is in the United States and has been 
for the last century.  If wealth were fairly evenly distributed, then inheritance’s impact on 
                                               
6
 Franco Modigliani, “The Role of Intergenerational Transfers and Life Cycle Saving in the Accumulation 
of Wealth,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 2 (1988): 15-40. JSTOR, www.jstor.org. 
7
 Jens Beckert, Inherited Wealth, (Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004), 15. 
8
 Beckert, Inherited Wealth, 15. 
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merit would be fairly minimal, because individuals would likely receive similar bequests.  
Unfortunately, this is not the case.  Since 1922, the earliest the data were available, the 
wealthiest one percent have maintained an extremely high share of the wealth, varying 
between 19.9 percent and 44.2 percent.9  Given how much of this wealth is unearned, it is 
in clear conflict with the principles of a merit based society and brings into question the 
association of wealth with individual achievement. 
Those who support unencumbered inheritance, from an economic standpoint, 
often argue that it is a source of capital that supports investment and therefore economic 
development.  Adam Smith laid the groundwork for this argument with his opposition to 
transfer taxes, including “taxes upon the transference of property from the dead to the 
living.”10  He believed that inheritance taxes were “unthrifty taxes that increase the 
revenue of the sovereign, which seldom maintains any but unproductive labourers at the 
expence of the capital of the people, which maintains none but productive.”11  
Economists who oppose inheritance taxes further argue that besides a loss in investment 
capital from taxes, there would be a further loss from individuals choosing to cease 
accumulating wealth coupled with an increase in consumption toward the end of their 
lives. 
An analysis of this viewpoint, unencumbered inheritance, finds two major flaws.  
First, this viewpoint appears to maintain that it supports “none but [the] productive.”  An 
individual who accumulates wealth throughout his or her life by making good 
investments and sound financial choices would certainly be following Smith’s theory of 
                                               
9
 G. William Domhoff, “Wealth, Income, and Power,” Who Rules America, 
http://sociology.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/power/wealth.html 
10
 Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 3: 317. 
11
 Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 3: 319. 
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the “invisible hand”—the theory that there is an efficient and invisible force driving the 
market.12 However, proponents of inheritance limitations argue the transfer of wealth 
from the dead to the living, when speaking of bequests made to heirs, is not an efficient 
means of allocating capital because it is not market driven.13  Because the desire for the 
accumulation of wealth can be considered an incentive for being productive, inheritance 
would be a natural disincentive.  Those who stand to receive enough of a fortune to place 
them in the wealthiest 1% of society, with continuing monumental income resulting from 
no effort on their part, have little reason to work. Furthermore, even if they try to use 
their wealth in a constructive manner, it may not be used as effectively as someone with a 
greater innate ability who lacked the opportunity to express it.  The receipt of unearned 
wealth bypasses the competition mechanisms of the market, resulting in a less efficient 
use of capital.14  Thus, it can be concluded that a capitalistic meritocratic system is not 
only best served by policies that redistribute unearned wealth; its fundamentals require it 
to do so. 
A second flaw in Smith’s argument is that taxation of inheritance, or 
redistribution of wealth, will “seldom maintain any but unproductive labourers.”  This 
makes the assumption that the revenue cannot serve a productive means.  The rest of this 
paper examines the historical precedent of the United States’ use of redistributive 
practices to provide opportunities for advancement.  In order to rise and fall in society, 
advancements (and conversely reductions) in status must be possible.  The examples of 
wealth redistribution, however, do predate the discovery of the New World.  If the truth 
                                               
12
 Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 3: 181. 
13
 Beckert, Inherited Wealth, 168. 
14
 Glenn E. Hoover, “The Economic Effects of Inheritance Taxes,” The American Economic Review 
(1927): 17: 38-49. JSTOR, www.jstor.org. 
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be told, there was opportunity for social mobility in England prior to the colonization of 
America.  Titles could be granted in response to exemplary service on the battlefield or 
elsewhere.  However, advancement in status was extraordinarily rare.  In feudal Europe, 
it was a respected principle that status and office were inherited along with wealth. 
This system of status of inheritance was due to a rigid society divided into the 
three estates of “those who prayed, those who fought, and those who labored.”15  It was 
only in the first estate, that of the church, that social advancement was easily visible and 
frequent.  Notable bishops, abbots, and even popes, including Pope Gregory VII, arose 
from humble and obscure backgrounds.16 The major reason for this was the church’s 
inheritance policies.  For much of the church’s history, clergymen were allowed to marry 
and, consequently, have children.  During the 11th and 12th centuries, major reforms 
completely disallowed this practice. 
Although many theological arguments were made for why clergymen should not 
be married, the question of church possessions and office in relation to the offspring of 
clergy was especially important.  Wealth that was the rightful possession of the church 
was bequeathed to the families of the ministry. 17  The practice of priests passing on their 
parishes to their sons became such a problem that Pope Innocence III made an issue of 
urging his bishops to dispose of those clergyman who had succeeded to their fathers’ 
churches.18  By the mid-thirteen century sex by members of the clergy, and therefore 
fathering offspring, was criminal fornication and grounds for removal from the church.  
                                               
15
 David Herlihy, “Three Patterns of Social Mobility in Medieval History,” The Journal of Interdisciplinary 
History 3, no. 4 (1973): 623. JSTOR, www.jstor.org. 
16
 Herlihy, “Three Patterns of Social Mobility in Medieval History,” 624.  
17
 I. S. Robinson, The Institutions of the Church, 1073-1216, in The New Cambridge Medieval History, ed. 
David Luscombe and Jonathan Riley-Smith (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 4: 436. 
18
 Robinson, The Institutions of the Church, 436. 
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Without inheritance, the offices of the church and command of its immense wealth were 
at the disposal of those who were capable of climbing the ranks of the first estate.  Men 
from all walks of life, many who were educated and raised by the church from youth, 
were placed in positions where they could demonstrate their level of inherent potential. 
The success of the North American colonies, later the United States, was arguably 
the success of a new system that included a capitalistic base.  Such a system hinged on 
equality, at least from a legal perspective, that could not exist in a three-tiered system.  
Efficient production and commercial intercourse requires equal legal privileges.19 A 
successful capitalistic system requires that a single class, such as nobility, not have the 
ability to control market actions according to whim—the forces of the market must 
operate on their own.20  The colonies of the United States went even a step beyond this by 
equalizing economic opportunity, at least to a greater extent than was present in Europe.  
While the United States has never been a perfect meritocracy, it offered a greater level of 
equal opportunity than the feudal system that preceded it.  The fairer the playing field 
from birth, the more meritocratic a society becomes.  For this reason, if wealth 
redistribution results in the equalization of opportunity, it can be seen as supporting the 
American ideal of merit. 
 The equalization of opportunity occurs as a result of the adjustment of resources, 
either taking from those who possess more or by giving to those with less.  Simply put, 
redistribution.  However, this must be done in a way that encourages individual 
achievement.  A straight transfer of wealth from one party to another simply changes the 
recipient of inheritance.  In order to encourage individual achievement, wealth must be 
                                               
19
 James W. Russel, Double Standard (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006), 64. 
20
 Russel, Double Standard, 64. 
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redistributed in a way that gives individuals tools to exercise their inherent potential, 
instead of simply acting as an effortless source of income.  
 In the United States, there has been spirited disagreement over the concept of 
wealth-distributive policies since before the founding.  This is because there have been 
numerous examples where such policies have been implemented.  Religious and political 
literature known to the settlers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, such as the 
Bible and James Harrington’s Oceana, include passages that advocate regular land 
redistribution.21 Of particular interest is the Israelites required redistribution of land every 
half-century, undertaken perhaps to avoid tribal rivalries or inequalities.22  Although no 
serious efforts were made to literally adopt the Bible’s redistribution of land, it is clear it 
impacted early land policies.23  In essence, further support for the concept of 
redistribution not being antithetical to Americanism lies in the fact that it has existed 
since the days of the colonies, long before Karl Marx ever wrote the Communist 
Manifesto.  It has been an essential ingredient in the United States becoming more 
meritocratic—the very thing that separates us from the monarchies from which our nation 
emerged.  Throughout American history a policy of merit based redistribution was 
implemented. 
 This is not to say there was not extreme hypocrisy in our nation’s founding in 
relation to its view of social mobility according to personal ability.  The founding fathers 
and subsequent leaders debated freedoms in buildings built by slaves24.  The lack of 
                                               
21
 Daniel J. Elazar, “Land and Liberty in American Civil Society,” Publius 18, no. 4 (1988): 1-29. JSTOR, 
www.jstor.org. 
22
 Leviticus. 25.8-17 New International Version. 
23
 Elazar, “Land and Liberty in American Civil Society,” 4-5. 
24
 United States. Congress. House. Committee on House Administration, “Emancipation Hall: A Tribute to 
the Slaves Who Helped Build the U.S. Capitol,” Hearing, September 25, 2007, 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_house_hearings&docid=f:41186.pdf 
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founding mothers also reminds us of merited individuals who were not allowed to 
contribute.  Good sociological arguments could be made that the United States, when 
considering the huge portion of the population that was enslaved or unable to vote, had its 
own form of caste system.  Even after the end of slavery and the appearance of women’s 
suffrage, policies both official and unofficial stood as a barrier to social mobility for 
minority groups.  In fact, the perpetually low socioeconomic status of groups like African 
Americans can be in part attributed to the failings of the United States to adopt a fully 
meritocratic system.  Status is still somewhat inherited as environmental factors are not 
equal across the spectrum. 
Regardless of the correspondence of rhetoric and reality, however, America 
gained the reputation of being a place of opportunity.  This reputation was a calling to the 
people of other nations, in essence saying “give me your tired, your poor, your huddled 
masses yearning to breathe free” and the chance of social mobility is precisely why those 
downtrodden immigrants came.  These masses felt they had a better chance of improving 
their status in society in the United States than in their country of origin. 
Because of the continued influx of populations from varying countries and 
continents, the United States was the only major world power that had no universal 
ethnicity, religion, or race.  We were unified by the few commonalities of our ancestors, 
things they shared with each other and with no other nation: American ideals.  These 
were beliefs in freedoms, equalities, and merit over birthright. 
These beliefs, like those of many peoples the world over, arose out of the 
circumstances of the American environment.  They were not invented at the founding of 
the nation; they emerged from the social, economic, and political realities of 
10
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colonization—all of which will be addressed in the next chapter.  This will be followed 
by the third chapter, which will discuss how meritocratic policy evolved as the northern 
United States industrialized, replacing purely agrarian means of social mobility with that 
of industry and education.  The last chapter will cover the same period as the third 
chapter, but will examine the south and the impacts of slavery and the Civil War on 
meritocratic practices. 
11
Bobo: Meritocracy: The American Precedent for Wealth Redistribution
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2009
Chapter 2 
Pioneers, Land Distribution, and the Colonial Process 
 The formation of the American meritocratic system was the result of several 
environmental historical circumstances.  A societal desire for merit was synthesized 
through the blending of the exploration and colonization methods of European powers 
with the physical as well as political realities of the American terrain.  The dangers 
involved in charting new lands led to a very specific reward system.  Opportunity for 
advancement was given in exchange for taking on the risks involved in finding new 
lands.  Those talented enough to accomplish the difficult goals involved in these 
expeditions were able to improve their socioeconomic standings.  This pattern was 
eventually repeated in the settlement process as well. 
 In April 1584, an expedition under Walter Raleigh explored the coast of North 
Carolina after receiving a charter from Queen Elizabeth I to do so.25  As newly located 
lands were considered the possession of the monarch, ownership or control of them had 
to be bestowed by England’s Queen.  For his exploration of the region, named Virginia in 
honor of the Virgin Queen, Raleigh received North American land as well as title.26  It 
could be argued that, because the majestic rulers of Europe invested in these expeditions, 
any resulting wealth was earned.  Such an argument, however, does not hold up to careful 
examination.  First, this vast new wealth of area and resources was already populated by 
diverse groups of people.  The conquest, genocide, and displacement of native peoples 
are not considered part of any major economic process of “earning” wealth.  Even at that 
time, Saint Thomas Aquinas’s writings on what constituted a legitimate war was well 
                                               
25
 Richard L. Morton, Colonial Virginia, vol. 1, The Tidewater Period 1607-1710 (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1960), 2. 
26
 Morton, Colonial Virginia, 2-3. 
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known, setting forth a series of requirements for a Christian nation to start and conduct a 
justifiable war.27  The conquest of the Americas failed to meet the requirements set out by 
Aquinas, lacking even that legitimacy.  Secondly, even if an economic rationale could be 
discovered for earning wealth through conquest, the question would still remain as to 
how to justify it as belonging to the monarch.  Such possessions were considered the 
monarch’s by right of their position as ruler of the nation, a position obtained through 
birthright rather than individual merit.  For these reasons the wealth of the New World 
must be regarded as unearned by the European monarchs who claimed it.  The dispersion 
of this wealth was not an act of kindness but rather a necessity of the age. 
Monarchs of Europe understood that if they wanted their subjects to go forth and 
expand the holdings of the empire, they needed to provide incentives for doing so.  Just 
as conquerors received the spoils of war, adventurers received the spoils of exploration 
which often included knighthood, governorship, and large grants of often still unexplored 
land.  A year after Raleigh’s first venture to the North America, his cousin Sir Richard 
Grenville returned to plant a settlement on Roanoke Island in an attempt to begin to reap 
the rewards of the discovery.28  The United States may have turned out quite differently if 
this had been the whole story of how colonization took place in the New World—
explorers found new lands, received rewards for their discoveries, and soon afterwards 
colonists went forward to start successful settlements. 
 This was not, however, the whole story.  Raleigh was not the first person to 
receive a charter for this particular expedition.  He received it only after his half-brother, 
                                               
27
 James Turner Johnson, “The Broken Tradition,” National Interest (1996): 27-36. Historical Abstracts, 
http://uclibs.org/pid/12775; Alexander Moseley, “Just War Theory,” The Internet Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/j/justwar.htm. 
28
 Morton, Colonial Virginia, 2-3. 
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Sir Humphrey Gilbert, was turned away by Spaniards on his first attempt only to be lost 
at sea on his second.29  These risks were perhaps one of the major reasons that exploring 
the unknown was often left to untitled men or the lowest of nobility.  These were men 
who often came from educated backgrounds but still had little or no wealth when 
compared to the higher echelons of society.  Instead, their success or failure depended on 
luck and merit. 
Just as dangerous as finding new lands was trying actually to settle them.  The 
settlers of Roanoke were not successful.  After a great deal of investment and work, the 
settlement failed when its inhabitants vanished.30  This may have been due to conflicts 
with natives, illnesses, or desertion for a plethora of other reasons.31  As a result of such 
difficulties, there were numerous unsuccessful colonization attempts.  From lesser known 
Ramea to Jamestown, settlements constantly failed while under siege by the harsh 
realities of the New World.32 
 The question then remains, what did the English government have to do to get 
people to come here?  From the point that Columbus first returned to Spain with gold, it 
was apparent that there were valuable resources to be had in America.33  There is no 
question as to why the major powers of Europe wanted it.  The dangers of early colonial 
life were a major deterrent to men of established holdings, or gentry, back in Europe to 
relocate to America.  Although there was noted passage of gentlemen in the initial 
                                               
29
 Morton, Colonial Virginia, 2. 
30
 John Wood Sweet, Introduction: Sea Changes, in Envisioning an English Empire: Jamestown and the 
Making of the North Atlantic World, ed. Robert Appelbaum and John Wood Sweet (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), 4; Morton, Colonial Virginia, 3. 
31
 James Horn, The Conquest of Eden: Possession and Dominion in Early Virginia, in Envisioning an 
English Empire: Jamestown and the Making of the North Atlantic World, ed. Robert Appelbaum and John 
Wood Sweet (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), 4; Morton, Colonial Virginia, 3; 
Sweet, Introduction: Sea Changes, 4. 
32
 Horn, The Conquest of Eden, 30; Morton, Colonial Virginia, 12. 
33
 Charles Gibson, Spain in America (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 8. 
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voyages to America, they were already in fast decline by the early to mid seventeenth 
century as news of starvation and mass deaths reached England.34   The lack of desire by 
the nobility to venture forth was coupled with their ineptitude at handling the rigors of the 
pioneer life.  Captain John Smith, undoubtedly like many pioneer leaders of the time, 
preferred skilled laborers over gentry, noting that the latter was more fit “to spoyle a 
commonwealth than to begin or maintain one.”35  Just as exploring was led by the lower 
echelons of society, so too was settling.  The nobility was forced to do whatever was 
necessary to compel the lower subjects of the empire to go forth and harness the raw 
materials of the Americas. 
Propaganda had its place in this equation.  Early colonists were often forbidden 
from writing home with discouragement, and early explorers certainly exaggerated both 
the friendliness of the natives as well as the ease of life in the new lands.36  This made 
news from the English colonies more optimistic than they might have been otherwise.  
However, the colonies’ success and the foundations for meritocratic practices lay in the 
many major concessions that England made to its early pioneers. 
 The willingness to make concessions owes no small part to the political 
environment in which England found itself.  By the time England attempted to stake its 
claim in America, other Europeans powers had already established themselves here, with 
the Spanish actively reaping enormous wealth to the south and the French having staked a 
claim to the north. 37  England’s choice of location was in major part decided by the area 
that was, as of yet, realistically unclaimed and completely unsettled by European 
                                               
34
 Thomas J. Wertenbaker, Patrician and Plebeian in Virginia or The Origin and Development of the Social 
Classes of the Old Dominion (New York: Russell and Russell, 1959), 8. 
35
 Wertenbaker, Patrician and Plebeian in Virginia, 7. 
36
 Morton, Colonial Virginia, 7; Horn, The Conquest of Eden, 28-29. 
37
 Sweet, Introduction: Sea Changes,  4, 12; Morton, Colonial Virginia, 7. 
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peoples.38  This, perhaps, made Queen Elizabeth I and the nobility particularly keen on 
doing whatever was necessary to make England’s holdings in North America quickly 
successful. 
 From the point that Sir Walter Raleigh contributed to the formation of the first 
Virginia company, England departed from its previous methods of colonization by 
putting it largely into the hands of entrepreneurs.39  This is the most noticeable of the 
aforementioned concessions when reflecting on later themes of meritocracy.  As opposed 
to a strict control under the direct management of the crown or nobility, the forces of the 
entrepreneurial class were allowed to shape the future.  These companies, including that 
of London and Plymouth, were granted charters that gave those and their descendants 
settling in the English colonies “all Liberties, Franchizes, and Immunities of Free 
Denizens and natural Subjects within any of our other Dominions to all Intents and 
Purposes, as if they had been abiding and born within this our Realm of England, or in 
any other of our Dominions.”40  These charters derive their authority from the monarch 
who in essence distributed vast tracts of land without requiring immediate monetary 
compensation.41  This was done for the greater benefit of the country, with the monarch 
understanding that that which makes the empire stronger, makes the monarch stronger.  
This afforded the Virginians protection under English law, ensuring they would not lose 
their rights by emigrating.42 
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 England’s and Spain’s colonies became very different from each other politically 
and philosophically because of the divergent conditions under which each developed.  
Spain’s colonization method to the south was a far more thorough conquest and 
subjugation of current inhabitants than was England’s.  This was in large part because of 
the political environment the Aztecs had created in the region prior to European arrival.  
The Aztecs had established an empire by means of aggressive military warfare against 
their neighbors, bringing numerous peoples under their control by means of force.43  
When Spanish forces led by Fernando Cortés began the conquest of the Aztec empire in 
1518, they were supported by many natives who saw them as liberators.44  When Cortés 
arrived at the Aztec capital of Tenochtitlan in 1519 to lay siege to it, his few hundred 
soldiers were reinforced by native forces that numbered in the thousands.45  From the 
view of the natives, in many ways, the Spanish were simply replacing one empire with 
another.  Because the Catholic nations’ claim to America was backed by the Church of 
Rome and their colonization efforts were supported by the resources of the Pope, they 
had the obligation to spread the faith to newly conquered peoples.46  After the several-
hundred-year Reconquista, in which the Catholic Spanish conquered the lands of the 
Muslim Moors, the people of Spain were prepared to repeat another religious conquest.  
Many of the same practices used on the Moors, such as encomiendas and repartimientos 
(lordship, collection of tribute, and exploitation of labor), were enthusiastically adapted in 
the Americas.47  Adapting the system of tribute was likely made even easier by the 
                                               
43
 Gibson, Spain in America, 26. 
44
 Gibson, Spain in America, 26. 
45
 Gibson, Spain in America, 27. 
46
 Gibson, Spain in America, 15; Horn, The Conquest of Eden, 25. 
47
 John Jay TePaske, Integral to Empire: The Vital Peripheries of Colonial Spanish America, in Negotiated 
Empires: Centers and Peripheries in the America, 1500-1820, ed. Christine Daniels and Michael V. 
Kennedy (New York: Routledge, 2002), 33. 
17
Bobo: Meritocracy: The American Precedent for Wealth Redistribution
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2009
discovery of precious metals in the new territories.48  This allowed a hierarchical 
structure to develop very similarly to the one that existed in its European counterpart. 
 England, on the other hand, had a completely different set of circumstances.  
Those early English pioneers who attempted to brave the New World looked to the 
examples of Spanish colonization and attempted to mimic them.  Unfortunately, this 
resulted in one failure after another.  There are several important reasons why English 
colonization could not work in the same manner that Spanish colonization had.  First, it 
did not encounter an Aztec-like empire that it could replace.  The English tried but were 
unable to find any groups willing to rebel against the Powhatan “chief of chiefs” whose 
control over the native groups in Virginia seemed quite firm.49  This would later lead to 
conflicts that paved the way for genocide rather than servitude, the latter being the case in 
Spanish possessions.  Furthermore, because it was a Protestant nation with a history of 
warfare with Catholics, England’s claims to the new world lacked papal support and had 
to be backed even more forcefully by other means.50  This meant it needed to build forts 
and settlements on the continent before it was squeezed out of the Americas altogether.  
Because the natives could not be fashioned into a labor force, as had been hoped, getting 
people to migrate there became even more crucial.  It was then particularly disappointing 
that the top priority of early pioneers of seeking out sources of gold, silver, and other 
precious metals was unsuccessful.51  Such discoveries would have paved the way for a 
flood of prospectors.  Instead economic realities required the colonists to switch from 
dreams of discovering valuable minerals to becoming farmers, paving the way for an 
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agrarian society.  By 1616, the growth of the cash crop tobacco became so popular that 
Sir Thomas Dale had to require those who grew it to also grow two acres of corn so that 
they would not starve.52 By comparing the two different American experiences, that of 
Spain and England, it is very clear why the latter was forced to change to a more 
meritocratic format.  It was a consequence of an environment that would not support the 
status quo of the medieval European hierarchy that preceded it.  Instead of granting 
control of conquered lands and peoples to military leaders, it gave land and rights to 
companies and colonists just to get them to immigrate. 
These grants weren’t made completely without reassurances that they would be 
used as intended.  The crown ensured that there was in these charters the means “to 
expulse, disfranchise, and put out of and from their said Company and Society for ever, 
all and every such Person and Persons, as having either promised or subscribed their 
Names to become Adventurers to the said Plantation…[but] have nevertheless either not 
put in any adventure at all for and towards the said Plantation, or else have refused or 
neglected” their responsibilities under the agreement.53  By this legal mechanism, those 
who were not contributing to the success of the venture could have their right to 
participate revoked.  Here we have members of this company being distributed virtually 
free land along with protections under English law in exchange for them doing 
everything they can to be successful in the new territory. 
At all levels of this system, opportunity to succeed or to fail is of key importance. 
It is true that in many cases, land was divided at least in part according to money 
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invested.54 Charters for new towns were typically granted at the request of men in the 
lower echelons of society, wealthy investors or otherwise educated individuals, which 
could be taken away if they did not result in a stable community within a reasonable 
time.55  This gave incentive for these entrepreneurs, who invested a great deal of time and 
effort getting a charter and promoting a town, to move quickly to ensure the success of 
their investment.   
The threat of having a charter revoked made those who invested money eager 
enough to ensure that at least some land was guaranteed to most men who were willing to 
move into the new township in order to get the settlement established in the required 
time.  By the late seventeenth century, the median acreage owned by men of Connecticut 
at death was 88 acres.56  Around the same time in Massachusetts, the average 
landholdings of the men of the communities of Rowley, Hingham, Newbury, and 
Deerfield were 25.9, 22.5, 13.8, 66 acres respectively.57  This was a level of wealth in 
terms of land in the general population that was unparalleled in the Old World.  
Meanwhile, those who promoted the establishment and success of such settlements 
averaged 2,910 acres.58 This meant that if the community was successful, the rise in the 
value of the land that these entrepreneurs received would make them quite wealthy by 
comparison with the average man.  This was not a system, like that of Europe, where land 
and wealth were bequeathed according to rules of succession.  This system awarded 
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wealth to individuals in a way that was commensurate to their contribution in the 
formation and success of a township. 
 Such a system can only be maintained as long as land remains freely available for 
dispersion.  Unfortunately, the incentive the monarch had for redistributing land was not 
shared by farmers and plantation owners.  The developing aristocracy in Virginia desired 
nothing more than to imitate the ruling elite of England.  Though the vast majority did 
not come from noble lineage, their desire to appear like they did led them to mimic the 
English nobility in dress, leisure activities, and daily life.59  Just like the ruling elite of 
Europe, they wanted to ensure the longstanding influence of their house and family name 
by accumulating then passing on land to their heirs. 
Land soon became a status indicator.  Men considered “wealthy” claimed 4,000 to 
6,000 acres on average, though some, such as William Byrd II, could find themselves 
inheriting acreage in excess of 20,000.60  Besides growing their own holdings, it could 
even be seen as in their best interests to limit the availability of new land to others, thus 
making their land more valuable. 
When viewed from this economic standpoint, the rebellions of early America 
reveal themselves to be conflicts about accumulation of wealth—that is the conflict 
between the old tradition of inherited wealth and status with the new American practice 
of wealth redistribution and equal opportunity.  It pitted those with great wealth, 
believing it theirs by birthright, against those who were fighting for what they believed 
was their right to opportunity. 
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 Bacon’s Rebellion occurring in the late seventeenth century is a case in point of 
this class conflict.  Although Nathaniel Bacon, Jr., the leader of the rebellion, was cousins 
by marriage with Virginian Governor William Berkeley, his chief adversary in the 
conflict, it was clear that each represented a different socioeconomic group.61  Berkeley 
described the economic inequalities that led to the social unrest, along with the group that 
supported his rival, quite aptly when lamenting his dangerous position in which he 
“governs a people wher six parts of seven at least are poore endebted discontended and 
armed.”62  The reason that the gap between the haves and have-nots had grown to a 
boiling point was in no small part due to the inequities that had grown in land acquisition. 
 Those whose industrious ancestors had already built them large estates had the 
economic means and connections to shape policies to ensure they remained on top of 
society without the need to prove their merit.  While the first half of the seventeenth 
century saw numerous men of humble origins elected to office, the second half found 
government becoming overly dominated by cronyism and nepotism.63  Indeed, one of the 
chief complaints made during the rebellion against Governor Berkeley, who had been 
installed by Royal appointment, was that he used his powers of appointment and rule to 
benefit himself and a very close circle of acquaintances.  By the time of Bacon’s 
rebellion, the people had been denied, for the most part, from picking their own 
representatives for the past fourteen years.64   
Although Native American attacks are often historically considered the major 
catalyst or dispute that sparked Bacon’s Rebellion, this is misleading.  It is true that 
                                               
61
 Morton, Colonial Virginia, 241. 
62
 Morton, Colonial Virginia, 261. 
63
 Wertenbaker, Patrician and Plebeian in Virginia, 11. 
64
 Morton, Colonial Virginia, 249. 
22
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 5 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 11
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol5/iss1/11
Bacon sought a commission to fight “hostile Indians” but it’s also clear that attacking 
hostiles quickly turned into wiping out all native tribes regardless of their loyalty to the 
colonists.65  Given the long history of negotiating, working with, and forging alliances 
with the various tribes, it cannot just be accepted at face value that it was difficult to 
distinguish between one group of natives and another, as historians such as Richard L. 
Morton suggest.  However, if the rebellion was really about wealth polarization and 
distribution, seizing land from natives would be seen as a social mechanism of 
redistribution.  This would also explain the resistance that Governor Berkeley and his 
followers had to Bacon’s demands.  The leading elite would work to stop any devaluation 
of their land by a sudden influx from annexation through warfare on Indians.  Indeed 
when reviewing the social circumstances leading to the rebellion as well as the actual 
accomplishments of the insurrection, economic disparity seems far more the underlying 
cause.   
When reviewing the policies before the rebellion, their purpose seems to be to 
ensure the polarization of wealth, with those already at the echelons of society 
maintaining or growing their position.  The policy of giving state land to those who 
brought new colonists to Virginia was a boon to the established elite.  They received land 
for bringing people who then had to work as their servants to repay the cost of their 
transport.66  Those with wealth, that is the few who could afford to bring a large number 
of people overseas, in essence had created a policy so that they could get paid in land for 
something they were already getting paid for in indentured servitude.  As the class 
struggle played out, Bacon’s men, comprised overwhelmingly of the lower classes, 
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plundered and pillaged homes and plantations of Berkeley’s supporters with Bacon 
making formal plans to seize the properties of those who supported the other side once 
victory was achieved.67  No such behavior was witnessed by Berkeley’s troops, who were 
paid militia.  Another tool that had been used to protect those in power from competition 
was a taxing system that was levied according to the poll rather than wealth or ability to 
pay and was operated by a closed corporation of justices of the peace that met in secret 
sessions.68  This taxing method had the impact of stifling attempts to climb the 
socioeconomic ranks while not being financially burdensome to those already at the top. 
Although Bacon’s rebellion was eventually suppressed, it was successful in changing 
taxing policies, curtailing excessive government fees, improving representation, and 
eliminating or pushing several tribes off their lands.69   
A similar tax was a chief complaint of those participating in Shays’ Rebellion, 
beginning over a century late in August of 1786 but stemming from similar economic 
causes.70  Unlike the south, however, the elite of the New England region had built their 
family wealth on the transatlantic slave trade.71  Though the merchant elite was far less 
pervasive when compared to the plantation owners of the South, it was evident from the 
tax laws that they also held far more sway in government policies.  After the American 
Revolution, the governments were in great need of revenue with Massachusetts owing 
approximately $14 million.72  This resulted in new taxation.  The difference between the 
methods of taxations that Shays and Bacon faced is important to fully understanding how 
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these taxes were custom fit to encourage polarization.  Both were designed to squeeze the 
lower and middle classes out of their wealth while leaving the more affluent relatively 
unscathed.  The Baconites faced it by poll alone while the Shaysites faced it by poll and 
property.  This is because the wealthy adversaries of Bacon had large plantations, a tax 
by property would have reached them harder (perhaps more proportionately) than one 
strictly by head count.  On the other hand, the wealthy adversaries of the Shaysites were 
merchants with little land and smaller families than farmers.  A tax by both poll and 
property proved most advantageous to them, being disproportionally high on poor 
farmers. 73 
This again had the result of preserving the wealth of the elite, while forcing those 
with fewer assets to give up what meager wealth they had.  Further evidence of the class 
conflict of the taxation policies was the composition of the rebels and militia.  The 
rebellion was led by farmer Daniel Shays and consisted of fellow farmers, many of them 
being militia men themselves called upon to put down the revolt.  Attempts to call upon 
the state militia to put down the revolt initially failed.  Wealthy men from Boston, a 
major merchant port, paid for an army of 4,400 “militia” (though mercenaries might be 
more accurate a term) to put an end to the rebellion early the next year.  Along with being 
afraid of the rebels’ wrath turning towards those who they were indebted to, the 
merchants also likely feared tax policy turning against them as well if the rebels couldn’t 
be made to pay.  The public at large seemed very sympathetic, if not empathetic, to the 
un-meritocratic plight that befell the Shaysites.  Consequently, though the rebellion was 
crushed, few were put to death.  Not even Shays himself faced the gallows. 
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The colonization and eventual rebellions of early America mirrored a later 
conundrum that would force an overall policy evolution.  In the beginning, there was 
opportunity for success or failure based on performance due to an abundance of land and 
a willingness to distribute it.  In the larger sense, the monarch of England could increase 
his power through exploitation of American resources but would lose control over his 
holdings in the new world if he couldn’t get a firm grip by way of settlements.  As such, 
charters and companies were utilized to give those of the lower echelons incentive to lead 
the settling process.  If their inventiveness and pragmatism was of a level worthy of 
success, they would reap profit from their investments.  If their abilities were lacking and 
they failed, they would lose their charters and the initial investment they made in the 
endeavor.  Indeed, many lowly nobles who set out to succeed in America but proved 
meritless had their status vanish, marrying beneath them with their family line 
disappearing in obscurity.74  In turn, those men of the lower echelons had incentive to 
give average men opportunity to succeed or fail by their own merit.  This was represented 
in the charters they acquired which guaranteed land and rights to any male member of the 
community. 
However, the storm on the horizon lay in a couple of serious questions.  What 
would happen when the land ran out?  What would happen if and when wealth moved 
from being agrarian based to some other form?  This model, in which opportunity is 
offered to individuals whose success or failure depends on their own ability, would have 
to be adapted to the challenges of a new and ever-changing environment.  When America 
was not living up to its reputation of opportunity and merit-based success, social unrest 
flourished—driven by the spurned masses whose feelings that the United States had a 
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promise it was not keeping caused them to take up resistance whatever way they knew 
how. 
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Chapter 3 
Industrialization, Unionization, Education, and the North 
 
The industrialization of the United States, taking place primarily over the course 
of the nineteenth century, marked major changes in the composition of the US economy, 
including the major components of wealth.  At the beginning of the century, only 10 
percent of the country's inhabitants lived in urban areas, no doubt reflecting the 
domination of agriculture in every region from north to south.75  Through to that time, 
wealth for the nation was found in land and agricultural output.  As the country expanded 
west by means of the Louisiana Purchase, Mexican-American War, and the slow 
genocide of the native peoples, acquired land was distributed to citizens usually without 
any more cost than the willingness to brave the elements and overcome the challenges of 
farming and forestry.  However, during this period another major change was occurring 
besides the fulfillment of the Manifest Destiny. 
 America's economic foundation shifted almost entirely from agriculture to 
manufacturing, making it the world's greatest industrial powerhouse.76  This is not to say 
that agriculture declined; it in fact expanded substantially over the course of the 
century.77 Despite its growth in volume, the percentage of the workforce participating in 
farming still dramatically declined.  By the end of nineteenth century, one out of every 
two Americans owed their livelihood to industrial production with half of those working 
directly in industry.78  Factories, unlike farming, were not dependent on huge tracts of 
lands for production.  Many required rivers and streams to function and benefitted from 
                                               
75
 Walter Licht, Industrializing America: The Nineteenth Century (Baltimore and London: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1995), xiii. 
76
 Licht, Industrializing America, xiv. 
77
 Licht, Industrializing America, 20. 
78
 Licht, Industrializing America, xiv. 
28
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 5 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 11
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol5/iss1/11
economies of scale, making it more cost effective, in many if not most cases, to build 
larger factories rather several smaller ones.  This led to physical concentration resulting 
in a huge increase in urbanization.  By the end of the century, such was the concentrating 
nature of industrialization that approximately 40 percent of Americans came to live in 
cities, and manufacturing managed to be contained mainly in the northeast region of the 
country.79  Besides changing livelihoods, a change in the components of wealth was also 
another consequence of industrialization.  In the north, waterways were not sufficient to 
allow merchant ships easy access to plantations, lands were not as favorable to 
cultivation, and a huge portion of those settling came more to establish ordered 
communities than seek large profits.80  Consequently, the north, particularly the New 
England area, was filled with farm families who managed to live well by producing more 
than enough to prosper but who lacked a large enough surplus to compete with southern 
plantations.81  They consumed at least three-fourths of what they created, often being left 
with only enough for barter with neighbors.82  This region did have its merchant elite that 
made its wealth from prosperous ports, but it couldn’t compare to the class structure of 
the south, where a plantation was often comparable to a feudal manner.83  Also, trading 
centers in New England declined by the early nineteenth century, coupled with a 
stagnation that prevailed in both commerce and farming.84  As a result of this system, 
wealth in the north was far more diffused at the start of the nineteenth century than in the 
south.  Where southern plantations could be visibly seen as the source of wealth in the 
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lower half of the United States, nothing comparable existed in the upper half before the 
period of industrialization. 
Before the advent of industrial modes of production, manufactured goods required 
hours of careful effort learned from years of apprenticeship in a craft.  For instance, in 
weaving the average duration of apprenticeships had been carefully regulated in England 
by powerful guilds, requiring a minimum of seven years training.85  Although there were 
no such guilds in the United States, titles such as apprentice, journeyman, and master 
continued to hold meaning and training still averaged a considerable three years.86  As a 
result of the skilled-labor requirement for textiles and the massive amount of work 
required to produce them, those who worked in the trade earned enough income from the 
sale of their product to be considered part of the middle class of their day.  Owners of 
these businesses, as with most crafts, were more often than not those who worked to 
produce the goods in question. 
 The ability to mass produce manufactured goods by unskilled labor changed this 
dynamic.   Because the workforce needed very little formal training, they were easily 
replaceable and required minimal pay.  Benjamin Franklin perhaps best described this 
change by pointing out, “it is the multitude of poor without land in a country, and who 
must work for others at low wages or starve, that enables undertakers to carry on a 
manufacture, and afford it cheap enough to prevent the importation of the same kind from 
abroad, and to bear the expense of its own exportation.”87  Start-up costs for mass 
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production manufacturing were relatively high because of the mechanisms involved.  
Owners and financial beneficiaries of the business thus tended to be the individuals who 
had the capital to finance the endeavor or the entrepreneurial skills to establish a 
business, rather than skilled laborers working in the particular field.  This caused a direct 
assault on the practice of apprenticeships.  In weaving, the practice of taking on 
apprentices was no longer commonplace by the turn of the nineteenth century.88  The 
factors of cheap labor coupled with high start-up costs led to a system of entrepreneurs 
and wealthy investors reaping the majority of the monetary benefits. 
It is important not to assume that an investor is automatically an entrepreneur. 
Investors were men of wealth, but because many were born to it, they were not 
necessarily men of the intelligence and fortitude it takes to start and run a profitable 
business.  The American industrial revolution depended on men with ingenuity and 
foresight at least as much as depending on men with investment capital.  Perhaps one of 
the greatest examples of men in the former group is Samuel Slater.  Britain’s policy of 
disallowing skilled laborers to emigrate made it so that only the most clandestine of 
skilled mechanics could find a way of making it to the United States.89Slater, perhaps the 
most well known of these figures, was able to barter with his rare knowledge of textile 
mills for an extremely lucrative deal with the self-made wealthy merchant Moses 
Brown.90  As it was, the Slater and Brown partnership gained a near monopoly on 
technological innovation and was able quickly to expand the first successful textile mill 
created in 1793 into an operation of dozens of such mills throughout the small area of 
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Rhode Island.91  Their monopoly didn’t continue past several years, however.  Former 
employees began working with their own investors to make competing mills.92 
The farm families of the northeast were contracted to work these types of mills 
thanks to the lack of any other available labor.93 This might seem like only a minor 
transition.  Indeed, it had been the hopes of men such as Thomas Jefferson and James 
Madison that manufacturing would take such a family-oriented direction, with small to 
medium sized workshops.94  By 1820, over 400 mill communities had formed and would 
have undoubtedly looked much as the two former presidents might have hoped.95 
There were major consequences to this change in family livelihoods.  The first 
was that families no longer produced the means to survive.  Consumption of the goods of 
others was now a requirement for survival.  This led to the wide-scale demand of a broad 
range of goods and services.  This was something the north had that the south lacked and 
a major reason why the innovation of the former dwarfed that of the latter.  
However, perhaps the most important difference of the textile industry from 
agriculture in the northern US—and a difference that was counter to the hopes of 
Jefferson and Madison—was that families worked in mills they did not own.   For the 
first time the owner was not typically the worker.  This led to conflicts, typically 
centering on distribution of profits.  It would be false to assume that the owner always 
had the upper hand in these disputes.  Families in effect had built-in labor unions.  When 
they were unhappy with their share, the entire workforce would often stop working or 
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leave altogether—production then ceased.96 This was naturally a major problem for the 
mill owner. 
It is the nature of capitalism for employers to minimize their expenses in order to 
maximize profits.  This cutting of costs includes limiting wages as much as possible, even 
if that means cutting pay down to subsistence or below it, forcing workers to rely on 
supplemental forms of income outside of their primary work.  This naturally conflicts 
with the interests of the wage earners, especially if they feel they aren’t receiving their 
fair share. Consequently, an adversarial relationship forms between the two groups.  This 
is why Slater first tried to hire orphans and poor children before turning to families; they 
were much easier opponents with whom to contend.97  It is also why, by the 1840s, 
owners of textile mills were happy to take advantage of the immigration into Rhode 
Island as well as a growing young population rather than continue with family 
contracting.98  This new workforce was not automatically united in the same way as a 
family, and unlike the head of a household, the supervisor of a mill no longer felt 
obligated to represent the workers' interests over those of the owner.  
This system, similar to the original land giveaways of colonization, allowed for a 
great deal of merit-based social mobility.  Slater and those like him managed to use their 
ingenuity, knowledge, and business savvy to make themselves extremely wealthy.  This 
is not to say that this system was by any means a perfect example of meritocracy.  Those 
who invested in factories tended to be from wealthy merchant families rather than always 
being self-made men.  This may have been why Slater resisted efforts from his investors 
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to pursue profits over the health of the mill communities he administered.99  He started 
low relative to the financial status he attained, perhaps giving him a more sympathetic, if 
not empathetic attitude toward those under him than his “silver spooner” business 
partners displayed. 
The involvement of inheritance in the investor class gives credence to the 
argument for a more even distribution of profits.  If wealthy investors and mill workers 
are in their respective roles as a consequence of circumstances out of their control, such 
as being born to one family over another, why should the investor reap greater benefits 
from the relationship than the worker?  The investor has chosen to invest wisely, with 
money he would not have under different circumstances of birth, just as the worker has 
chosen employment according to the limited options available in great part due to class.  
In such a circumstance, where inheritance is an accepted factor, meritocratic practices 
would demand more equal distribution of revenues than large profits for one group and 
subsistence for the other. 
Regardless of the different circumstances of early industrialization, the struggle 
over distribution of revenues between worker and owner was ongoing.  Even earlier than 
the mid-nineteenth century, successful attempts had been made to start industries without 
family contracting.  What was perhaps the first successful large scale factory ($400,000 
in cost or ten times the scale of the typical Slater mill) in the US appeared in Waltham, 
Massachusetts, in 1814.100  Built by Francis Cabot Lowell, a man who had made his 
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wealth in textile production, it employed young women from New England farm 
families.101 
The Waltham mill and its employment system were so successful that a much 
larger mill community was built a short time later at a new settlement in Massachusetts 
named Lowell.102  Because of the large-scale nature of this project and those like it, only 
men of enormous wealth were sought as contributors.  Approximately eighty men 
provided in excess of $8 million over fifteen years to construct the largest and most 
successful industrial city in the US at the time.103  The bigger the mills, the more 
profitable they became.  The more profitable they were, the more they were worth.  By 
1850, the textile firm’s assets in the city were worth $12 million.104  In this way, the 
north’s defining feature of wealth became industry just as the south’s was the plantation.  
One of the major reasons for the ever-increasing profit and concentration of wealth was 
the inclination of investors to look constantly for ways to minimize the cost of labor; 
thereby keeping more of the revenues as profit rather than paying them out as wages.  At 
this time, that meant hiring young, unskilled adults, usually women. 
 Unmarried and considered second class citizens, young women were the perfect 
employees for maximizing profits.  They had no representation to effect change, were far 
from anyone who might care enough about them to make serious demands on their 
behalf, and were expected to be supported by their families if pay dropped to below 
subsistence levels.   They also only worked in the mill temporarily, making them much 
less likely to become discontent with conditions. The company-owned boardinghouses, in 
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which the “mill girls” were required to live, acted as another level of control—matrons 
acted as overseers there making sure the employees lived in a way that was moral and in 
the best interests of the companies that employed them.105 
Even with employment favorable to employers, the diametrically opposed 
positions of the relationship would cause conflict.  When the boom in supply finally 
caused a cut in demand price, owners sought to cut operating costs by reducing wages, 
increasing work hours, and raising the price of boarding.  The mill girls were central to 
their families' incomes by this time and were not as easily undercut as their employers no 
doubt wanted.  This gave them considerable cause and support in fighting for their 
interests.  The boardinghouses ironically gave them the means to combat unfavorable 
work changes.  Living under one roof had worked to unite the women so much that peer 
pressure allowed them to carry out effective resistance when faced with treatment that 
they felt was unfair or unacceptable.106  Although not family by blood, their shared 
experiences working and living together made them undoubtedly feel a close sisterhood.  
In response to wage cuts, they first began striking in the in the 1830s, followed by 
advocating vocally for a ten-hour workday in the 1840s.107  Despite avoiding the family 
contracting that had been prevalent in the late eighteenth century through early nineteenth 
century in Rhode Island, owners in Lowell still found themselves facing the same 
problem.  Work often stopped due to striking, with large numbers of women collectively 
deciding to pick up and go home. 108 Just as in Rhode Island, the industries of 
Massachusetts decided the best way to move forward was to switch to another labor force 
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that was more exploitable.  In this case they turned to Irish immigrant labor, which began 
increasing in earnest from 1845.109 
Although the Rhode Island and Massachusetts mills had many differences, the 
way that they started and evolved over time shared certain fundamentals.  These 
fundamentals were repeated over and over again throughout the north wherever factories 
appeared.  Those who started the factories were typically men of ingenuity coupled with 
experience in the field, like Slater or former mill employees.  These men were often not 
from the upper class, but their start-up capital did usually come from investors who were 
from established wealthy families.  In this way the boom of industrialization helped many 
men make substantial gains in status while also supporting many established families, 
which maintained their social position. 
The factory laborers themselves were also able to gain a degree of mobility.  
Some were able to climb substantially in their own lifetimes while others worked to 
afford their children a chance at achieving a higher status.  The city of Newburyport 
nearly doubled its population during its decade of major industrialization, boasting 
around thirteen thousand by 1851.110  Of the 287 laboring families who resided in 
Newburyport for at least a decade between 1850 and 1880, one sixth gained a very high 
degree of mobility in that at least one family member was able to move into a middle-
class occupation.111  Of these forty-seven families, in twenty-two cases the male laborer 
was able to acquire a higher occupation while in twenty-five cases it was the son of the 
original laborer who managed to climb out of the working class.112 
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For the earlier generations, climbing in status was made possible primarily by the 
reasonably large supply of arable land outside of the city.113  Sixteen of the twenty-two 
families gained status by saving money from working in the factory and purchasing local 
farmland.114  Most likely they would work both at the factory and on their own farm for 
quite some time before abandoning their mill occupations permanently.  Although it 
might seem surprising that mill workers would turn to farming to gain in status, it should 
be taken into account that two-thirds were immigrants from rural Ireland while most of 
the remainder were migrants from the farming communities of New England.115  
Although farming might seem just another type of manual labor, those who purchased 
farms moved up in class thanks to their acquisition of wealth, not their specific daily 
duties.  Of the total labor families, most remained fairly static in their wealth never 
acquiring even $300 in property (a little more than the approximate wealth that might be 
expected of a homeowner.)116  Those who managed to be farm owners, on the other hand, 
had typical wealth of around $1300.117  The remaining six families from this older 
generation became small business owners achieving wealth usually higher than $300 but 
lower than $1000.118  Although the business group had less wealth initially, owning a 
tavern or working as a “provisioner” offered their offspring a greater probability to attain 
high status positions than that of the farm owners.119 
                                               
113
 Thernstrom, Poverty and Progress, 139. 
114
 Thernstrom, Poverty and Progress, 139. 
115
 Thernstrom, Poverty and Progress, 140. 
116
 Thernstrom, Poverty and Progress, 139. 
117
 Thernstrom, Poverty and Progress, 140. 
118
 Thernstrom, Poverty and Progress, 142. 
119
 Thernstrom, Poverty and Progress, 142. 
38
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 5 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 11
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol5/iss1/11
Of the twenty-five families who made up the later generation that advanced in 
status, not a single one of them did so through agriculture.120  Instead, approximately half 
of them rose through acquisition of a small business, while the remainder did so by 
becoming employed in white collar jobs—a feat not accomplished by any of the previous 
generation of class climbers.121  Although many of these youths had at least some 
experience as factory workers, all of them climbed into the middle class by pursuing 
opportunities outside of the corporate ladder of the mills.122  Although those who entered 
business ventures did not necessarily need education, those who were employed in white-
collar jobs did.123  Consequently, those from the latter group usually came from families 
who were better off than those from the former group.  White-collar workers typically 
came from households with more assets, such as owning a home.124  A greater amount of 
income, or wealth, was likely needed because of the lost income suffered by families 
whose sons were in school instead of working.  Young women were often able to help 
compensate for this loss.  Their earnings often paved the way for their brothers to attend 
school longer, leading the family as a whole to gain upward social mobility.125 
Those families who were not able to move out of a labor occupation were still 
usually able to improve their overall economic position.  Of the 240 laboring families that 
did not move into a non-manual occupation, 145 still gained some degree of positive 
mobility either by having a family member move into a skilled labor position or by 
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accumulating significant property.126  The sons of skilled laborers, however, were far 
more likely slip back into unskilled occupations than the sons of white-collar workers.127  
The case of the 287 Newburyport labor families gives a good glimpse into the social 
mobility available in the time period for factory workers.  It should not be considered a 
perfectly accurate representation of the overall population because most labor families 
were frequently transient, making data unavailable.  It is quite likely that the families who 
remained in place for at least a decade were offered somewhat better opportunities for 
advancement.  However, the data available does highlight how industrialization 
encouraged concentrations of population, increased opportunities for income (relative to 
other available means of employment), and the specialization of labor that led to a vibrant 
middle class.  However, the non-meritocratic elements of the process did cause constant 
struggle between those born with wealth and those born without it. 
Because of increased costs of living, wage cuts, increased hours, declining 
working conditions, or some other occurrence that changed the distribution of wealth 
emanating from the place of employment, workers frequently resisted through work 
stoppages and other means.  The Federal Society of Journeymen Cordwainers began in 
1794 and developed into the first trade union, performing the first organized strike of 
American workingmen in 1799.128  This organization tried to fight the consequences of 
industrialization, attempting to keep certain professions as skilled labor that were being 
infringed upon by the unskilled labor of the mill workers. Several other unions also arose 
over these first few decades of industrialization, but few survived the fluctuations in the 
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economy, legal trials, and the major business collapse of 1819.129  In the end, unions that 
came in direct conflict with industrialization failed.  The passage of time could not be 
stopped, and the consumer could not be forced to pay more for a product manufactured 
by skilled labor than a cheaper, mass-produced alternative.  If such had been the case, the 
ideal of meritocracy would have been disproven.  Work effort is far less a centralized 
tenant of meritocracy than is productivity.  If an individual works harder than another but 
is less productive, he can hardly be considered to have the greater ability of the two. 
This is not to say that all unionization was a doomed endeavor.  Those unions that 
did not directly stand in the way of technological progress, instead trying to negotiate the 
distribution of the fruits of productivity, faired far better.  Shoemaker William Heighton 
formed the nation’s first federated union body, the Mechanics Union of Trade 
Associations, in Philadelphia in 1827.  Heighton and his organization published the 
Mechanics’ Free Press, the nation’s first labor newspaper, advocating equal access to 
education and land.130  Access to land had been a historical means of social mobility by 
meritocratic means, while education was becoming the new standard form for doing so.  
Heighton's organization also attacked powerful men who made their profits with the aid 
of preferential treatment by the state rather than actual productivity.131  The efforts of 
workers in organized labor movements were often successful to varying degrees.   
The Working Men’s Party, established by men such as Heighton, proved very 
successful in winning elections.  It ran on a platform of universal school education, the 
abolition of imprisonment for debt, restrictions on monopolies, socioeconomic equality in 
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conscription, legal protections for unions, and other working-class causes.132  Although 
not all of these goals were met immediately, significant progress was made in each of 
these areas during the time of the Working Men’s Party and on the period after, all the 
way to modern times.  The fact that these issues have continued to resurface shows that 
they are not just matters of a specific era but speak rather to the nature of industrialization 
and meritocratic principle.  Often, in response to labor demands, employers then sought 
to hire less expensive sources of labor.  Despite this, progress in labor rights and 
improvements in education continued to come to fruition over time. 
The north developed a robust educational system to satisfy industries and the 
demands of city life.  At a Lyceum lecture in Newburyport in 1845, Horace Mann, a 
vocal advocate for education, attributed the lack of greater social mobility to “the 
systematic denial of the means of knowledge to the common people.”133  Major 
industrialization had brought with it broad recognition that education was needed for 
meritocratic processes to continue.   The concentration of population allowed vocal 
advocates like Mann to argue before a wide audience that “the distance between the two 
extremes of society is lengthening instead of being abridged” and that the only reasonable 
course of action was to “open the doors of knowledge to all, and those who have the 
capacity and ambition will do the rest for themselves.”134  This argument was finally an 
admission that those who did not have an education had an extreme disadvantage to those 
who had been well schooled.  Because most individuals who received education did so in 
their youth while being supported by their families, education or lack thereof was 
attributable to circumstances of birth.  In Newburyport, the response to this argument was 
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the construction of a community center, reading room, and public school system.  The 
funds to pay for these endeavors came disproportionately from the rich, but the owners of 
industries benefitted by receiving competent white collar workers.  When opportunity is 
given to the masses the whole of society benefits. 
Educational institutions were created at the behest of and benefit to both the 
wealthy and the poor.  Major cities contained schools tailored according to age, gender, 
ability, and socioeconomic factors including race.  For instance, mid-nineteenth-century 
Philadelphia had general grammar schools as well as institutes for higher learning for 
white males, such as the Central High School, and white females, such as the Girls’ 
Normal School (teaching women to be schoolteachers).135  Meanwhile, those who found 
themselves in the minority had access to such places of learning as the Girard College for 
Orphans, the Institute for Colored Youth, and the Pennsylvania School for the Deaf.136  
There were technical schools based on gender, such as the Baldwin Locomotive Works 
and Pennsylvania School of Design for Women.137 Philadelphia, like many northern 
cities, had a very diverse manufacturing center that included proprietary as well as 
corporate entities. With 4,542 businesses worth approximately $32 million according to 
an 1850 census, the city had varied labor-force demands and the economic means to 
educate workers as it needed.138  An important detail of the varying places of education is 
that even the non-technical schools taught specific work skills such as furniture-making, 
tailoring, and shoemaking to boys and cleaning, sewing, cooking, and laundry to girls.139  
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The purpose of schools for the lower classes was usually to prepare pupils directly for 
work rather than higher education. 
Industrialization for the north was a social process as much as it was a process 
involving developing technology.  As wealth shifted from agriculture, the challenges of 
establishing meritocracy in a capitalistic society changed.  The previous theory, that the 
frontier acted as a “safety valve” by allowing people to seek “Illinois wheat or California 
gold,” has been shown to be flawed.140  The Newburyport newspaper of the 1850-1880 
reported only a single instance of a local laborer who successfully settled West, doing so 
by being treasurer at a volunteer fire company and then stealing the treasury funds.141  
Those who successfully settled west were typically “artisans, schoolteachers, farmers, 
and unsuccessful businessmen.”142  The social mobility that the Northern laborer received 
had to come from the north.  This was only possible by leveling the playing field to some 
degree, allowing the working class access to education.  Through free public education, 
meritocratic principles had the chance to continue to benefit the north and further engrain 
themselves into the fibers of the American psyche. 
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Chapter 4 
Slavery, Civil War, and the South 
  For over a century, historians have argued over the primary causes of the Civil 
War.  Some name one specific cause, which ranges from the common choice of slavery 
to the more obscure, such as the popularization of the beard.143  Others look at it from a 
more sociological perspective.  For instance, historian David Williams argues that it was 
a “Rich Man’s War,” taking place because of the interests of the wealthy—the North 
using the war as an excuse to suppress progress in labor reform and the South fighting to 
prevent the white poor from demanding emancipation for their own economic benefits.144 
Many of these causes undoubtedly did affect the war, but was there a primary cause? 
The meritocratic viewpoint would argue that slavery and class struggle were 
important components of an overall theme.  The Civil War was a referendum on societal 
structures.  The North was a region where social mobility had been continuously 
supported by a vibrant middle class when compared to the South, which was much more 
polarized.  Slavery itself was the mechanism that Southerners used as the foundation for a 
system whose meritocratic principles were subordinated or eliminated in favor of a 
system of inherited status.  However, if another mechanism had been used to the same 
effect, the Civil War would have still likely occurred.  The American industrial 
revolution not only showed how deep was the chasm between the two societies, but it 
made it even greater. 
Wealth had been deeply concentrated in the plantation system, with the owners 
reaping the huge majority of the benefits of agricultural output.  In this system, the 
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middle class had been virtually absent with slaves and indentured servants carrying the 
majority of the burden of labor.145  Plantations were largely centered in the South because 
of the larger availability of arable lands and waterways needed to transport goods.146   
Whereas the North had a system that encouraged conflict between worker and 
owner, each making gains and concessions (arguably to the benefit of both), such a cycle 
was not as prominent in the antebellum South.  Crops had consistently been the primary 
export of the region, and the fields were worked by slaves instead of paid laborers.  Even 
in the few industries that the area had, slaves carried out the majority of the work.147  
Work stoppages and sabotage did take place, but slaves could be brutalized by their 
owners in ways that workers could not.148   Consequently, slaves were unlike their paid 
counterparts in the North in that they could not strike or petition. 
The master-slave dynamic was by definition non-meritocratic.  Slaves were 
hindered or precluded by law from rising in status and wealth, making it impossible for 
them to achieve according to merit.  Those who argue that slaves and Northern laborers 
had a shared experience, at least from an economic standpoint, are oversimplifying.  The 
product of slave labor, unlike that of the Northern factory workers, was not split between 
themselves and their owners.  Rather than receiving wages and deciding on an individual 
basis which goods to purchase, their needs were provided for.149  This had the effect of 
making small businessmen who acted as middle men, such as local grocers, less common 
in the South.  The nature of slavery also meant that non-bonded labor was at a serious 
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disadvantage.  The wages of free men had to compete with the price of a slave which, 
once paid for, only cost the owner maintenance rather than regular pay.   Slaves were an 
investment and source of wealth.  Beyond being just “a bonded labor force that generated 
wealth from agricultural and other labor” they also generated wealth through their 
“production (breeding) of slaves for market.”150  Meanwhile, the hiring of a laborer only 
amounted to paying a cost of production, not an investment that would generate future 
profits and wealth.  In endeavors like farming, this led free men to be employed in 
sharecropping or tenant farming arrangements but not for the direct planting and 
harvesting of a plantation.151 
The gap between the haves and have-nots, fed by barriers in meritocratic means of 
improving the position of the latter, had led to Bacon’s Rebellion.  Before the rebellion, 
steps had been taken to divide the poor across racial lines in order to keep them separate 
and more easily controlled.  This was done first by declaring any non-free blacks 
“servants for life” in 1661.152  This measure proved insufficient, however, as Bacon’s 
Rebellion saw both blacks and whites take up arms together against their wealthy 
oppressors.153  That conflict, instead of teaching those in the Southern upper class always 
to make social mobility reasonably attainable, taught them to divide the poor class even 
further according to race.  As a consequence, blacks become officially slaves rather than 
indentured servants, slave labor became preferred over indentured servitude, laws were 
codified to make penalties harsher for blacks than whites, interracial marriage was 
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banned, and certain professions were restricted to whites only.154  These changes allowed 
a clear social division to be made, with poor whites attaining higher status than all blacks.  
By eliminating competition from blacks for middle-class positions, this most likely 
unified the position of the middle class with that of the upper class.  While it may have 
hurt poor whites financially, it gave them a psychological boost in self-esteem. 
The uncomfortable reality of armed indentured servants, black and white, then led 
to the uncomfortable reality of over four million blacks (almost all of them slaves) 
making up over a third of the slave-state population by 1860.155  The lack of the ability to 
rise in status according to merit led to well over 250 slave rebellions in the South.156  In 
the years leading up to the Civil War, slave rebellions were on the rise.157  In order to 
decrease the likeliness of revolts, laws were passed throughout the South barring blacks 
from doing a wide variety of activities.  Certain laws curtailed activities closely linked to 
direct violence, such as a prohibition on possessing arms or striking Christian Whites.158  
Some laws, however, were a direct attempt to make slaves ignorant of even the 
possibility of improving their position.  For instance, emancipated slaves were eventually 
required to leave the region so that they might not stand as an example for those still held 
in bondage.159  All blacks were also eventually prohibited from reading or writing—an 
attempt to block off knowledge of the outside world that might make them aware that it 
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was not their lack of ability that impeded them from succeeding but their lack of 
opportunity to do so.160 
If unrest was the only result of the South’s extreme polarization, that might be an 
acceptable consequence in exchange for the massive production by plantations resulting 
from increasing returns to scale.  Rising according to merit allows the most productive 
individuals control of social resources according to their ability.  Thus, the belief in 
meritocracy encompasses the theory that self-interest coupled with equality of 
opportunity results in the most productive society.  What were the losses in production? 
It is no leap of faith to tie innovation to increased production.  Technological 
discoveries create faster and more efficient ways of producing.  In the South, however, 
there was a severe lack of technological innovation when compared to the North.  
Without a strong middle class, the two basic classes of a plantation system had very 
different consumptions patterns.  In this type of society those at the top tend to spend the 
bulk of their income on imported luxury goods while those at the bottom spend their 
available resources on necessities.161  This overall consumption pattern does not lead to 
the wide-scale demand of a broad range of goods and services that would support a 
vibrant middle class.  Consequently, few urban areas develop.  Those that do, center their 
purpose solely on the exportation of the staple commodity and distribution of imports.  
This gives those with wealth little incentive to invest in educating the lower classes in 
anything unrelated to farming.162 
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This is not to say that the South did not have institutions of higher learning; they 
were simply out of reach for the lower classes and likely reflected an interest in 
agriculture over other endeavors.  The upper classes desired education for their offspring 
so that they could maintain their position of power.  This leads to an interesting 
conundrum.  Institutions of higher learning are often places of open discourse where logic 
and knowledge are typically encouraged to produce the most intelligent, capable 
graduates.  How does an institution do this in a society where about a third of its 
members are slaves?  Open discourse would undoubtedly lead these future leaders of 
Southern society to be faced constantly with facts that support that slavery wholly 
destroys any chances of meritocratic practices by suppressing the growth of a middle 
class, stifling innovation, and violating the most basic concepts of fairness.  Slavery had 
been generally viewed as a necessary evil until the 1830s, when planters launched a 
massive campaign to spread the concept that slavery was a benefit to both the slave and 
the rest of society.163  As a consequence, even if a great amount of dissent remained in 
some corners of the South, beliefs in official channels and institutions of Southern society 
began to conform more to the wishes of the wealthy. 
This left post-secondary education in a troubling position. It can be expected that 
discourse in places of higher learning do not fully coincide with what is popular in high 
society, but to allow such a condemning conclusion of a practice that is so central to the 
Southern hierarchy could have catastrophic effects.  As such, men who held positions in 
the academy were required to adhere strictly to proslavery positions.  Those who did not 
were regularly stripped of their positions in the two to three decades preceding the civil 
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war.164  This was easily accomplished because those in positions of political power got 
there by spending money on campaigns generated by slave wealth.165  The precedent was 
set.  Post-secondary schools and places of learning in the North could freely discuss and 
debate issues affecting socioeconomic advancement, thereby influencing policies 
including those that led to compulsory education.  In the South, education was twisted in 
a way that limited dissent on important societal institutions. 
When knowledge in places of higher learning is curtailed to wholly support an 
agenda, it limits the thinking of minds that need the most broadening, those of the future 
leaders of society.  A merit-based system is dynamic, not allowing for a permanent upper 
class that becomes stagnant.  It is supported by having a multitude of diverse ideas, not 
rigid ideology.  This lack of creativity was a possible contributing cause to the slow 
development of manufacturing in the region.  Because Southern industries were returning 
profits two to three times greater than investments in agriculture, industrialization should 
have had tremendous growth in the region.166   Unfortunately, because of the lack of 
meritocratic social structure, capital was not invested in factories in the South relative to 
their profit generating power during the country’s period of industrialization.  Although 
the institution of slavery undoubtedly made manufacture more profitable, it also served to 
slow its growth.  While industrialization benefits from concentration, whites feared 
having too many blacks concentrated in an area, especially urban settings.167  When such 
a large part of a population is enslaved and prone to revolt if given the opportunity, this 
fear would seem extremely reasonable.  Furthermore, status had been linked in the minds 
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of the Southern gentry to mean large plantations.168  Those in power felt no pressure to 
diversify because there was virtually no competition from a nearly non-existent middle 
class. 
Likewise, because slavery made up such a large portion of the labor in the South, 
there was also no pressure from the labor force.  For instance, the mills in the North had 
employed the cheapest form of labor they could find, offering those laborers more money 
than they could make in any other facet. 169  This was an economic benefit to both the 
worker and the employer.  If workers find a better wage in another field, they can leave 
their current field of employment, causing a smaller labor pool.  This would lead to 
possible labor shortages in many less profitable fields that cannot afford to match the 
going rate of labor.  Although it is true that slaves were often hired out, the majority were 
utilized by their owners directly, even in manufacturing.170  Because of this, the same 
economic forces that might cause Northern laborers to switch work did not apply to 
slaves who had neither the choice nor the incentive.  Consequently, the availability of a 
work force for a particular endeavor, especially if it required unskilled labor, was likely 
less correlated to its profitability in the South than it was in the North. 
The actual reasons the South seceded appears to hinge on fears of change in the 
social structure of their society.  By the outset of the Civil War, the bottom half of society 
held less than five percent of the agricultural wealth and about half of the South’s 
personal income went to just over a thousand families.171  Just a few decades prior, land 
had been readily available to the poor.  It had been reasonably inexpensive and loans had 
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been available to poor farmers through government assistance.172  In 1836, at the urging 
of Andrew Jackson, Congress passed the Specie Circular Act making it extremely 
difficult for small farmers to acquire loans for farming.173  The revolution in textile 
production, coupled with Eli Whitney’s invention of the cotton gin, made cotton the 
major cash crop.174  It also had the impact of making slavery more central to profitable 
farming.175  Unfortunately, cotton’s success led to overproduction.  This in turn led cotton 
income to be cut nearly in half.176  With less income to pay their existing loans and now 
virtually no means of securing new loans, poor farmers were required to sell their land or 
lose it through auction.   
Meanwhile, rich plantation owners expanded their growing agricultural empires 
by buying up available land, eventually causing substantial price increases, making it 
impossible for non-land owners, or those with small farms, to increase their holdings.177  
Even in the plantation system, had slave labor not existed, tenant farmers may have had 
greater means with which to negotiate the distribution of their productivity.  As it was, 
the wages of non-bonded labor would always have to compete with the costs of bonded 
labor.  Slaves were the basis of their socioeconomically polarized system, making 
abolition a threat to the system as a whole.  Because slavery benefitted the very small 
segment of society that made up the wealthy to the detriment of everyone else, 
slaveholder interests were most politically threatened by non-slaveholding whites.  In the 
period leading up to the South’s secession, many upper-class secessionists were afraid of 
                                               
172
 Williams, A People’s History of the Civil War, 15. 
173
 Williams, A People’s History of the Civil War, 15-16. 
174
 Licht, Industrializing America, 35. 
175
 Williams, A People’s History of the Civil War, 16. 
176
 Williams, A People’s History of the Civil War, 15 
177
 Williams, A People’s History of the Civil War, 16. 
53
Bobo: Meritocracy: The American Precedent for Wealth Redistribution
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2009
“an Abolition party in the South, of Southern men.”178 The election of Lincoln may have 
been the official catalyst of Southern secessionists, but those in power in the South likely 
feared the combined efforts of Northern abolitionist groups and growing anti-slavery 
sentiment amongst the poor and middle class in their own region.  Their only hope of 
preserving their social structure as it existed was by forming their own nation, thereby 
keeping the two abolitionist threats separate.  Meanwhile, Northern business interests 
could not risk losing access to the resources of the South as well as its markets.179  These 
were the economic foundations that gave financial backing to the voice of the many 
moral and religious arguments for abolition. 
It is clear that by the outset of the American Civil War the South had already lost 
the industrial revolution.  It contained only 15 percent of the nation’s manufacturing by 
1860.180  It could be argued that this was a primary cause in it losing the Civil War, never 
being able to compete in fielding military war machines at the rate of its northern 
adversary.  Another factor emphasizing how poorly prepared the infrastructure of the 
South was for the war was that the North produced much more food.181  Without access 
to Northern goods, starvation became a problem exasperated by Confederate taxation and 
impressments that came down heavier on food production than cotton production.182  The 
non-meritocratic institution of slavery both hurt industrial expansion and the growing of 
badly needed edible crops.  This was coupled with the unenthusiastic nature of the lower 
classes in supporting the war.  On the outset, most Southerners wanted to remain in the 
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Union.183  Before the war was over, many Southern counties seceded from the 
Confederation back to Union hands.184  At the same time the Southern elite was fighting 
the North, they were also fighting against their own people’s inclinations for a fairer 
social structure.  The same system lacking in meritocratic practice that gave the elites of 
the South cause to leave the Union, also prevented it from being able to do so 
successfully. 
The emancipation of slaves resulted in arguably the greatest incidence of wealth 
redistribution, when adjusted for inflation, in the history of the United States.  With a 
mean value of $933, the freeing of slaves amounted to redistributing approximately $3.7 
billion in wealth.185  Slaves accounted for the largest source of wealth in the South at 
roughly 43 percent, making this act one of social transformation.186  Up until that time, 
there had been 383,635 slaveholders in the 15 slave states, or less than five percent of the 
free population of those states.187  They held this wealth for the benefit of their families, 
who made up twenty-five percent of the free families in the region.188  Therefore, this 
wealth was taken directly from what is roughly the wealthiest 3 percent of the society and 
redistributed to the poorest third, those freed from bondage. 
When examining the concentration of slave wealth among slaveholders, the 
depolarizing effects of this act are even more evident.  While the mean number of slaves 
owned by slaveholders was 10.3, the median number was five.189 This shows how 
lopsided slave ownership was among those who had them.  Although it is impossible to 
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calculate the exact effects of emancipation on wealth distribution in the South due to the 
destruction caused by the Civil War, it is possible to theorize with reasonable assurance 
at least a couple of important results.   If the value of other assets were closer together 
than the value of slaves, this would cause emancipation to bring the overall worth of 
former slaveholders closer together.  What is less theoretical among the many effects of 
emancipation is its impact on the wealth of non-slaveholders, especially farmers.  It is 
extremely likely that the abolition of bonded labor caused a revaluing of labor’s 
cooperating factors in production.  This is supported by the fact that overall cotton 
production declined, in part, thanks to freed people withdrawing from the work force or 
reducing the number of hours worked.190  Such a reevaluation would almost certainly 
have caused an appreciation or depreciation in other assets, such as land.  It is highly 
likely, however, that the change in value of other assets would have more positively 
affected the wealth of non-slaveholders than that of slaveholders.  Consequently, 
emancipation likely increased the wealth of non-slaveholders as a percent, if not in finite 
numbers. 
The argument that the Civil War could have been avoided often cites evidence 
that slaveholders would have accepted financial compensation in exchange for the freeing 
of slaves.  Although the net worth of slaves amounted to half of the nation’s GNP in 
1860, there are examples in which far less than market value was paid.191  In the District 
of Columbia, for instance, compensation was paid by the government in the amount of 
$300 per slave, which by any means of calculation amounts to only a fraction of actual 
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value.192  Slaves were not, however, central to the Washington, D.C. economy in the 
same way that they were to slaveholding states—especially the ones where large 
plantations dominated the economy.  The destruction of slavery as an institution had a 
cost to society in lost production.  The effects of the decrease in consumption due to 
increased “leisure” in the South by freed persons can be calculated to be the cost of 
emancipation.193 This figure comes to approximately $2 billion.194  Slave states may have 
required some form of compensation to account for this loss in overall production. 
Additional evidence in support of the argument that compensating slaveholders 
could have avoided the war takes into account the cost of the Civil War itself.  By using 
the figures of government expenditures, draft costs, losses in human capital, and risk 
premium in soldiers' wage bills, and decreases in the value of physical capital the direct 
cost of the Civil war can be calculated.195  These figures come to approximately $3.4 
billion for the North and $3.3 billion for the South.196  In the North, the decrease in 
consumption caused by the war could be said to represent the indirect costs.  This comes 
out to approximately $4.5 billion.197  Repairs to Southern economic infrastructure were 
completed by the end of the 1870s.198  Consequently, the losses in income and 
consumption felt through 1879 as a result of damaged infrastructure as well as the war 
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could be said to amount to the indirect costs of the Civil War for the South.199  These 
figures come to a total of just under $250 per person or approximately $3 billion.200   
In the end, if just compensation were to be paid for the value of the slaves as well 
as the losses in production caused by the demise of the institution, the figure would still 
come out to be $8.5 billion less than the cost of having a Civil War.  This would seem to 
support the argument that a war was the least cost effective method of solving the issue of 
slavery.  The theory of meritocracy argues, however, that the Civil War wasn’t just about 
getting rid of the institution of slavery.  By this theory, the Civil War was not only about 
making the South offer more equality of opportunity but also about redistributing wealth 
in a society that had become polarized because of its non-meritocratic foundations.  The 
need to redistribute wealth would seem to preclude compensation for lost slaves.  
Because those in power are almost certain to have refused to give up their slaves without 
being paid for them, the Civil War was unavoidable.  The only other alternative might 
have been the creation of large-scale programs to increase the wealth of those who did 
not have it.  The costs and scopes of such programs were likely beyond the political 
capital of any major US entity at the time and probably past the sociological theories of 
the age.  Furthermore, even if they were possible, no study to date has estimated the costs 
of such an undertaking.  Without such knowledge, assuming the Civil War was really 
about redistributing wealth, it is impossible to tell whether or not there was a plausible 
alternative. 
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Conclusions 
 What kind of system does the United States have?  What are that system’s goals?  
Our country developed its unique form of government as a consequence of historical 
circumstance.  It began as an experiment of venture capitalists.  Its early colonists were 
granted the freedoms of representative democracy because the crown had no means of 
governing from across the sea.  Industrialization brought the social problems of 
urbanization.  These social problems were solved by socialized solutions including 
compulsory education and unionization.  This country shed the last vestiges of its 
feudalistic past in a costly and bloody Civil War.  The system we have has been 
described as a capitalistic representative democracy with socialized institutions.  This 
may describe the “what” and our historical circumstances may describe the “how” but 
why?  What is our purpose?  Our goal of “forming a more perfect union” is not one 
without direction.  Our direction is meritocracy. 
Capitalism has been used as a tool of efficiency and production.  In the end, 
however, its arguments of an unfettered market must stay within the boundaries of what 
is considered fair.  When the machines of industry treat the worker as nothing more than 
a component, those machines have been brought to a halt time and time again.  While the 
powers of manufacture must depend on laborers, laborers should always be able to 
depend on modes of production to act as a key ingredient in meritocratic processes.  
When our GNP depended most heavily on agriculture, land was made available for those 
with the ability and desire to work it.  When our country depended on mills and factories, 
education, unionization, and the means to support a vibrant middle class were created to 
ensure a dynamic system where merit still resulted in social mobility.  Those social 
institutions that have survived are the ones who learned that progress cannot be stopped, 
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even if the fruits of progress can be more fairly distributed.  Throughout American 
history the argument for capitalism has been made not only as a system that results in the 
most material goods and services, but as a system that promotes fairness by allowing 
individuals and institutions to rise and fall according to ability.  If at some point in our 
future it fails to do this, it will have outlived its purpose. 
Representative democracy is meant as a form of government that indirectly 
carries out the will of the people.  Unlike direct democracy, it is not as dependent on the 
whims of a populace not fully educated upon the matters of governing.  It relies on 
representatives whose primary job is to research the issues at hand and act within the best 
interests of the people it governs.  When it doesn’t do this, when the desires for personal 
gain create the diseases of cronyism, favoritism, and nepotism on the body politic, the 
result is revolt, rebellion, and Civil War.  Self-interest cannot extend to those who 
govern.  Their ambitions must be secondary to the desire to create policies that encourage 
an equal playing field, not one that favors their friends, family, and personal wealth. 
 Central to all these issues is the issue of wealth.  Older than our economic system 
and system of government, is the concept of ownership.  No economic or political system 
can exist without weighing in on the issue of property.  Individuals should be allowed to 
amass wealth, invest it, use it in pursuit of their desires.  Our system depends on it.  
However, our system’s survival also depends on maintaining a meritocratic means of 
amassing wealth, of using it fairly and in a way that does not infringe upon others’ fair 
chances at a “pursuit of happiness.”  In the end, that’s what it is all about.  From the 
beginning of our history, that is what it has been about.  Going forward, in our economic 
and social policies, that is what it should be about. 
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